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1 INTRODUCTION
Dempster-Shafer theory [4, 16] is a formal framework for decision-making under uncertainty in
situations in which some predicates cannot be assigned subjective probabilities. e core proposal
of Dempster-Shafer theory is that, in such cases, the missing value can be replaced by a range of
values, the lower and upper bounds of which are assigned by belief and plausibility functions (cf.
Definition 2). is situation can still be concretely captured with probabilistic tools, specifically in
the framework of probability spaces, i.e. structures X = (S,A, µ) where S is a nonempty (finite) set,
A is a σ -algebra of subsets of S , and µ : A→ [0, 1] is a countably additive probability measure. In
probability spaces, belief and plausibility functions naturally arise as the inner and outer measures
induced by µ (cf. [5, Proposition 3.1]; relevant definitions are reported in Section 2). Moreover,
every belief function can be represented as the inner measure of some probability space (cf. [5,
eorem 3.3]), in a way that makes use of a logical perspective on beliefs and probabilities.
Central to Dempster-Shafer theory is the rule of combination of beliefs (representing e.g. ev-
idence, hints, or preferences) proceeding from multiple independent sources which might be in
conflict with each other. Intuitively, the combined belief according to the Dempster-Shafer rule
highlights the converging portions of evidence, and downplays the conflicting ones.
Connections between Rough Set eory and Dempster-Shafer theory have been made since
the beginning of the development of Rough Set eory [12, 13], with particular regard to the
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(epistemic) logical perspective on approximation spaces [5, 11, 15, 17], and also to the study of
several types of algebraic structures arising from and generalizing approximation spaces [8, 18, 19].
Also on the basis of algebraic and logical insights, in [1], a methodology is introduced to gener-
alize Rough Set eory from sets to formal concepts, the central structures in the field of Formal
Concept Analysis [6], and in [9, 10], the proof-theoretic aspects of this generalization are explored.
Using these insights and results, and in particular building on cf. [1, Section 7.3] in the present pa-
per we propose a generalization of Dempster-Shafer theory to formal concepts.
e starting point of our proposal is an order-theoretic analysis of the toggle between finite
probability spaces and belief functions on finite sets, with a particular focus on [5, eorem 3.3].
e insights gained from this analysis are then put to use to define a formal framework of belief
functions on (finite) formal contexts (cf. Definition 3.1), and (finite) conceptual probability spaces
(i.e. probability spaces based on (finite) formal contexts, cf. Definition 3.3). In this framework,
we show that belief functions on finite formal contexts can be represented as inner measures of
some conceptual probability spaces. We define a rule of combination of belief functions on formal
contexts, and illustrate the behaviour of this framework on some case studies involving decision-
making problems based on classification.
is preliminary exploration points towards the possibility of extending the scope of an impor-
tant tool for reasoning and decision-making under uncertainty to all areas of application of Formal
Concept Analysis, and to categorization problems in particular.
2 ORDER-THEORETIC ANALYSIS
In this section, we collect preliminaries on belief and plausibility functions on sets, finite proba-
bility spaces, and develop an order theoretic analysis of these notions which leads to an algebraic
reformulation of [5, eorem 3.3].
Belief, plausibility and mass functions. A belief function on a set S is a map bel : P(S) → [0, 1]
such that bel(S) = 1, and for every n ∈ N,
bel(A1 ∪ · · · ∪An) ≥
∑
∅,I ⊆1, ...,n
(−1) |I |+1bel
(⋂
i ∈I
Ai
)
. (1)
A plausibility function on S is a map pl : P(S) → [0, 1] such that pl(S) = 1, and for every n ∈ N,
pl(A1 ∪ A2 ∪ ... ∪An) ≤
∑
∅,I ⊆1,2, ...,n
(−1) |I |+1pl
(⋂
i ∈I
Ai
)
. (2)
Belief and plausibility functions on sets are interchangeable notions: for every belief function
bel as above, the assignment X 7→ 1 − bel(X ) defines a plausibility function on S , and for every
plausibility function pl as above, the assignment X 7→ 1 − pl(X ) defines a belief function on S . A
mass function on a set S is a map m : P(S) → [0, 1] such that∑
X ⊆S
m(X ) = 1. (3)
On finite sets, belief (resp. plausibility) functions and mass functions are interchangeable notions:
any mass function m as above induces the belief function belm : P(S) → [0, 1] defined as
belm(X ) :=
∑
Y ⊆X
m(Y ) for every X ⊆ S, (4)
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and conversely, any belief function bel as above induces the mass function mbel : P(S) → [0, 1]
defined as
mbel(X ) := bel(X ) −
∑
Y ⊆X
(−1) |XrY |bel(Y ) for every X ⊆ S . (5)
A probability space is a structureX = (S,A, µ)where S is a nonempty (finite) set,A is a σ -algebra
of subsets of S , and µ : A→ [0, 1] is a countably additive probability measure. Let e : A ֒→ P(S)
denote the natural embedding of A into the powerset algebra of S . Any µ as above induces the
inner and outer measures µ∗, µ
∗ : P(S) → [0, 1], respectively defined as
µ∗(Z ) := sup{µ(b) | b ∈ A and e(b) ⊆ Z } and µ
∗(Z ) := inf{µ(b) | b ∈ A and Z ⊆ e(b)}.
By construction, µ∗(e(b)) = µ(b) = µ
∗(e(b)) for every b ∈ A and µ∗(Z ) = 1− µ∗(Z ) for every Z ⊆ S .
Moreover, for every probability space X = (S,A, µ), the inner (resp. outer) measure induced by µ
is a belief (resp. plausibility) function on S (cf. [5, Proposition 3.1]).
Order-theoretic analysis. In a finite probability spaceX as above, the natural embedding e : A ֒→
P(S) is a complete laice homomorphism (in fact it is a complete Boolean algebra homomorphism,
but in the context of Boolean algebras, these two notions collapse). Hence, the right and le
adjoints of e exist, denoted ι,γ : P(S)։ A respectively, and defined as
ι(Y ) :=
⋃
{a ∈ A | e(a) ⊆ Y } and γ (Y ) :=
⋂
{a ∈ A | Y ⊆ e(a)}.
Lemma 2.1. For every finite probability space X = (S,A, µ), and every Y ∈ P(S),
µ∗(Y ) = µ(ι(Y )) and µ
∗(Y ) = µ(γ (Y )).
Proof. We only show the first identity. From the definitions of µ∗, ι and the additivity of µ , we
get: µ∗(Y ) =
∨
{µ(a) | a ∈ A and e(a) ⊆ Y } = µ(
⋃
{a | a ∈ A and e(a) ⊆ Y }) = µ(ι(Y )). 
e next proposition is an algebraic reformulation of [5, eorem 3.3].
Theorem 2.2. For any belief function bel : P(S) → [0, 1] on a finite set S there exists a finite
probability space X = (S ′,A, µ), and a Boolean algebra embedding h : P(S) ֒→ P(S ′) such that
bel(X ) = µ∗(h(X )).
Proof. Since S ′ is finite, as discussed above we can assume that bel arises from a mass function
m on P(S). We let S ′ := {(X ,u) | X ⊆ S and u ∈ X }, and let A be the Boolean subalgebra of
P(S ′) generated by {X ∗ | X ∈ P(S)}, where X ∗ := {(X ,u) | u ∈ X } for every X ∈ P(S). Notice
that, for any X ,Y ∈ P(S), if X , Y , then X ∗ ∩ Y ∗ = . Hence, we define the probability measure
µ : A → [0, 1] by leing µ(X ∗) := m(X ) for any X ∈ P(S), and then extending it by additivity to
the whole domain of A. Let h : P(S) → P(S ′) be defined by the assignment h(X ) := {(Y ,u) ∈ S ′ |
u ∈ X }. It is routine to check that h is an injective Boolean algebra homomorphism. Finally, let
X ∈ P(S), and let us show that µ∗(h(X )) = bel(X ). Since the structures are finite, µ∗(h(X )) = µ(W )
whereW :=
⋃
{Y ∗ | Y ∗ ⊆ h(X )}. Hence, noticing that Y ∗ ⊆ h(X ) iff Y ⊆ X , and recalling that any
two distinct generators are disjoint, µ(W ) =
∑
Y ⊆X µ(Y
∗) =
∑
Y ⊆X m(Y ) = bel(X ), as required. 
3 CONCEPTUAL DS-STRUCTURES AND CONCEPTUAL PROBABILITY SPACES
3.1 Preliminaries and definitions
Formal contexts and their concept laices. A formal context [6], or polarity, is a structure P =
(A,X , I ) such that A and X are sets, and I ⊆ A × X is a binary relation. Formal contexts can be
thought of as abstract representations of databases, where elements of A and X represent objects
and features, respectively, and the relation I records whether a given object has a given feature.
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Every formal context as above induces maps (·)↑ : P(A) → P(X ) and (·)↓ : P(X ) → P(A),
respectively defined by the assignments
B↑ := {x ∈ X | ∀a(a ∈ B ⇒ aIx)} and Y ↓ := {a ∈ A | ∀x(x ∈ Y ⇒ aIx)}. (6)
A formal concept of P is a pair c = ([[c]], ([c])) such that [[c]] ⊆ A, ([c]) ⊆ X , and [[c]]↑ = ([c]) and
([c])↓ = [[c]]. A subset B ⊆ A (resp. Y ⊆ X ) is said to be closed if B = B↑↓ (resp. Y = Y ↓↑). e set of
objects [[c]] is intuitively understood as the extension of the concept c , while the set of features ([c])
is understood as its intension. e set L(P) of the formal concepts of P can be partially ordered as
follows: for any c,d ∈ L(P),
c ≤ d iff [[c]] ⊆ [[d]] iff ([d]) ⊆ ([c]). (7)
With this order, L(P) is a complete laice, the concept laice P+ of P. As is well known, any complete
laice L is isomorphic to the concept laice P+ of some formal context P. A formal context P is
finite if its associated concept laice P+ is a finite laice.1
Conceptual DS-structures and conceptual probability spaces. e notions of DS-structures and
probability spaces can be generalized from sets to polarities as follows.
Definition 3.1. If P = (A,X , I ) is a (finite) formal context, a mass function on P is a map m : P+ →
[0, 1] such that
∑
c ∈P+ m(c) = 1, and if [[⊥]] =  then m(⊥) = 0.
A conceptual DS-structure is a tuple D = (P,m) such that P is finite formal context, and m is a
mass function on P.
Notice that for a formal context P = (A,X , I ), the boom element of P+ is defined as ⊥ =
([[⊥]], ([⊥])), where ([⊥]) := X and [[⊥]] := ([⊥])↓ = {a ∈ A | ∀x(aIx)}. Hence, the extension of ⊥
might in some cases be nonempty. If so, it is implausible to require the mass of ⊥ to always be
zero. is explains the requirement that m(⊥) = 0 applies only if [[⊥]] = ∅.
Belief and plausibility functions arise from conceptual DS-structures as follows.
Definition 3.2. For any conceptual DS-structure D = (P,m), let belm : P
+ → [0, 1] and plm :
P
+ → [0, 1] be defined by the following assignments: for every c ∈ P+,
belm(c) :=
∑
c ′≤c
m(c) and plm(c) :=
∑
[[c ′∧c]],∅
m(c). (8)
Definition 3.3. A conceptual probability space is a structure X = (P,A, µ) where P is a finite
formal context, A is a σ -algebra of concepts of P, i.e. a laice embedding e : A ֒→ P+ exists of A
into the concept laice of P, and µ : A→ [0, 1] is a countably additive probability measure.
In any conceptual probability space X as above, the embedding e : A ֒→ P+ is a complete laice
homomorphism, and hence, similarly to the Boolean seing, the right and le adjoints of e exist,
denoted ι,γ : P+ ։ A respectively, and defined as
ι(c) :=
∨
{a ∈ A | e(a) ≤ c} and γ (c) :=
∧
{a ∈ A | c ≤ e(a)}. (9)
Using these maps, we can define the inner and outer measures µ∗, µ
∗ : P+ → [0, 1] as follows: for
every c ∈ P+,
µ∗(c) = µ(ι(c)) and µ
∗(c) = µ(γ (c)).
1Notice that if P = (A, X , I ) is such that A and X are finite sets then P+ is a finite laice, but the converse is not true in
general. For instance, if P = (A, X , I ) gives rise to a finite laice, then so does P′ := (A′, X , I ′) where A′ := A ∪ N and
a
′
I
′
x iff a′ ∈ A and aIx .
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3.2 Representing conceptual DS-structures as conceptual probability spaces
e aim of this section is to prove the following
Theorem 3.4. For any conceptual DS-structureD = (P,m) there exists a finite conceptual probabil-
ity spaceX = (P′,A, µ), and ameet-preserving embeddingh : P+ ֒→ P′+ such that belm(c) = µ∗(h(c))
and plm(c) = µ
∗(h(c)).
We proceed via a series of lemmas. Let P = (A,X , I ) be a finite formal context and P+ be its
laice of concepts. We can assume without loss of generality that X ↓ = . We define the polarity
P
′
= (A′,X ′, I ′) as follows:
• A′ := {(c,a) | a ∈ [[c]]};
• X ′ := {(c, x) | x ∈ X };
• (c,a)I ′(d, x) if and only if c , d or aIx .
For every c ∈ P+, let c∗ = ({(c,a) | a ∈ [[c]]}, {(c,a) | a ∈ [[c]]}↑).
Lemma 3.5. For every c ∈ P+, the set {(c,a) | a ∈ [[c]]} is the extension of a formal concept.
Proof. Notice that {(c,a) | a ∈ [[c]]}↑ = {(d, x) ∈ X ′ | d , c} ∪ {(c, x) ∈ X ′ | x ∈ ([c])}. Since,
by assumption, X ↓ = , it follows that {(d, x) ∈ X ′ | d , c}↓ = {(c,a) ∈ A′ | a ∈ [[c]]}. Since the
map (·)↓ is antitone, {(c,a) | a ∈ [[c]]}↑↓ ≤ {(d, x) ∈ X ′ | d , c}↓ = {(c,a) ∈ A′ | a ∈ [[c]]}. 
e lemma above implies that c∗ ∈ P′+. Let A be the sub join-semilaice of P′+ join-generated
by {c∗ | c ∈ P+}.
Lemma 3.6. e laice A is a finite Boolean algebra, generated by the set of its atoms {c∗ | c ∈ P+}
Proof. at the generators are atoms follows immediately from the fact that if c , d , then
[[c∗]] ∩ [[d∗]] = ∅. To show that A is a Boolean algebra, it is enough to show that for any U ⊆ P+,
the set
⋃
c ∈U [[c
∗]] is a closed subset of A′. We have (
⋃
c ∈U [[c
∗]])↑ =
⋂
c ∈U ([c
∗]). As discussed in
the lemma above, ([c∗]) = {(d, x) ∈ X ′ | d , c} ∪ {(c, x) ∈ X ′ | x ∈ ([c])}. erefore
⋂
c ∈U ([c
∗]) ⊇
{(d, x) ∈ X ′ | d < U }. Since X ↓ = , it follows that {(d, x) ∈ X ′ | d < U }↓ = {(c,a) ∈ A′ | c ∈
U } =
⋃
c ∈U [[c
∗]]. erefore (
⋃
c ∈U [[c
∗]])↑↓ = (
⋂
c ∈U ([c
∗]))↓ ⊆
⋃
c ∈U [[c
∗]], as required. 
We can thus define the map µ : A→ [0, 1] first on the generators of A, by leing µ(c∗) = m(c)
for every c ∈ P+, and uniquely extend it to a measure on A. Let e : A ֒→ P′+ be the natural
embedding. By construction, e is a laice homomorphism, hence the right and le adjoint of e
exist, denoted ι and γ , respectively.
Let us define the map h : P+ ֒→ P′+ as follows: for every c ∈ P+,
h(c) = ({(d,a) ∈ A′ | a ∈ [[c]]}, {(d,a) ∈ A′ | a ∈ [[c]]}↑). (10)
In the two lemmas below we show that h is indeed well defined:
Lemma 3.7. {(d,a) | a ∈ [[c]]}↑ = {(e, x) ∈ X ′ | x ∈ ([[e]] ∩ [[c]])↑}.
Proof. Le to right inclusion: Assume (e, x) ∈ {(d,a) | a ∈ [[c]]}↑. If e , d for all (d,a) ∈
{(d,a) | a ∈ [[c]]}, then [[e]] ∩ [[c]] = ∅, hence x ∈ ()↑. If d = e , then aIx for all a ∈ [[e]] ∩ [[c]],
hence x ∈ ([[e]] ∩ [[c]])↑.
Right to le inclusion: Let (e, x) ∈ {(e, x) ∈ X ′ | x ∈ ([[e]] ∩ [[c]])↑} and let (e,a) ∈ {(d,a) | a ∈
[[c]]}. Since x ∈ ([[e]] ∩ [[c]])↑ by assumption, it follows that aIx . 
Lemma 3.8. {(e, x) ∈ X ′ | x ∈ ([[e]] ∩ [[c]])↑}↓ ⊆ {(d,a) ∈ A′ | x ∈ [[c]]}
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Proof. Let (d,a) be such that a < [[c]]. en a < [[c]] ∩ [[d]] and there exists x0 ∈ ([[d]] ∩ [[c]])
↑
such that (a, x0) < I . Hence, (d, x0) ∈ {(e, x) ∈ X
′ | x ∈ ([[e]] ∩ [[c]])↑} and (d,a) < {(e, x) ∈ X ′ | x ∈
([[e]] ∩ [[c]])↑}↓. 
Lemma 3.9. e map h defined above is a meet-preserving embedding.
Proof. Let c,d ∈ P+. If c , d , it is immediate that h(c) , h(d). Now, let us show that h is
meet-preserving:
[[h(c)]] ∩ [[h(d)]] ={(e,a) | x ∈ [[c]]} ∩ {(e,a) ∈| x ∈ [[c]]}
={(e,a) | x ∈ [[c]] ∩ [[d]]} = {(e,a) | x ∈ [[c ∧ d]]} = [[h(c ∧ d)]].

Let us show that bel(c) = µ∗(h(c)) for every c ∈ P
+. Since A is an atomic Boolean algebra, every
element is equal to the join of the atoms below it. Furthermore, notice that d ≤ c if and only if
d∗ ≤ h(c). erefore, we have:
µ∗(h(c)) = µ(ι(h(c))) = µ
(∨
{a ∈ A | a ≤ h(c)}
)
= µ
(∨ {
d∗ ∈ A | d ∈ P+ and d∗ ≤ h(c)
})
(because each a ∈ A is equal to the join of the atoms below it)
= µ
(∨
{d∗ ∈ A | d ≤ c}
)
= Σ{µ(d∗) | d ≤ c} = Σ{m(c) | d ≤ c} = belm(V (p)).
Finally, let us show that pl(c) = µ∗(h(c)) for every c ∈ P+. LetU ⊆ P+, c ∈ P+ and (d,a) ∈ A′. If
(d,a) ∈ h(c), then (d,a) ∈
∨
d ∈U d
∗ if and only if d ∈ U . Furthermore, (d,a) ∈ h(c) if and only if
a ∈ [[c]] ∩ [[d]]. Hence, (d,a) ∈ h(c) implies that [[c]] ∩ [[d]] , ∅. We have:
∧{∨
d ∈U
d∗
 U ⊆ P and h(c) ≤ ∨
d ∈U
d∗
}
=
∧{∨
d ∈U
d∗
 [[d]] ∩ [[c]] , ∅ implies d ∈ U
}
=
∨
{d∗ | [[d]] ∩ [[c]] , ∅}. (11)
e last equality holds because A is a Boolean algebra. Hence, we have:
∧
{a ∈ A | c ≤ e(a)}
µ∗(h(c)) = µ(γ (h(c))) = µ
(∧
{a ∈ A | h(c) ≤ e(a)}
)
= µ
(∧ {∨
d ∈U
d∗
 U ⊆ P and h(c) ≤ ∨
d ∈U
d∗
})
(because each a ∈ A is equal to the join of the atoms d∗ below it)
= µ
(∨
{d∗ | [[c]] ∩ [[d]] , ∅}
)
(see (11))
= Σ{µ(d∗) | [[c]] ∩ [[d]] , ∅} (because µ is additive)
= Σ{m(d) | [[c]] ∩ [[d]] , ∅} = plm(c).
is concludes the proof of eorem 3.4.
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3.3 Combination of evidence
Let P = (A,X , I ) be a finite formal context and m1, m2 be two mass functions on P. We build
the combined mass function m1⊕2 following Dempster-Shafer’s procedure. If
∑
{m1(c1) · m2(c2) |
[[c1 ∧ c2]] , ∅} , 0, then the combined mass function m1⊕2 is defined as follows:
m1⊕2 : P
+ → [0, 1] (12)
c 7→

0 if [[c]] = ∅∑
{m1(c1) ·m2(c2) | c1 ∧ c2 = c}∑
{m1(c1) ·m2(c2) | [[c1 ∧ c2]] , ∅}
otherwise.
It is straightforward to verify that m1⊕2 is a mass function on P.
4 EXAMPLE: CATEGORIZATION THEORY
In the present section, we discuss how the basic tools of Dempster-Shafer theory on formal con-
texts and their associated concept laices introduced in the previous sections can be applied to the
formalization of categorization decisions in various areas. e application we propose here builds
on [2, 3], where formal contexts are regarded as abstract representations of databases (e.g. of mar-
ket products and their relevant features) and their associated formal concepts as categories, each
admiing both an extensional characterization (in terms of the objects that are members of the
given category) and an intensional characterization (in terms of the features that are part of the
description of the given category).
Music databases. Consider the problem of categorizing a given song S on the base of user-inputs.
e categorization procedure consists in aggregating the replies of users to a questionnaire about S .
e questionnaire makes reference to the objects of a database, which, for the sake of simplicity, we
represent as the following polarity P = (A,X , I ), with A = {a,b, c} a given set of songs (a = A-ha –
Take onme,b = Beyonce –Crazy in love, c = Marvin Gaye – Sexual healing) andX = {w, x ,y, z} a set
of relevant features: w = keyboards, x = upbeat tempo, y = gospel-trained singers, z= whispering
voices.
w x y z
a
        
b
❂❂❂❂❂❂❂
✁✁✁✁✁✁✁
c
❂❂❂❂❂❂❂❂
e questionnaire makes also reference to the (names of) the categories-as-formal-concepts
arising from P, i.e. the elements of the following laice C:
⊤ = (abc, ∅)
Pop = (ab, x)
❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧
R&B = (bc,y)
❘❘❘❘❘❘❘❘❘❘❘❘❘
E-Pop = (a,wx) Pop-R&B = (b, xy)
❘❘❘❘❘❘❘❘❘❘❘❘❘❘
❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧
Funk = (c,yz)
⊥ = (∅,wxyz)
❘❘❘❘❘❘❘❘❘❘❘❘❘❘
❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧❧
Specifically, the questionnaire contains statements of the following types:
• “Song S is similar to song e”, for e ∈ A;
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• “Song S belongs to category C”, for C ∈ C.
Each user chooses one or more such statements and grades it on the following scale:
{0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1}.
ree users give the following responses:
• User 1: “Song S is similar to a”, graded 0.2.
• User 2: “Song S is similar to a” graded 0.6, and “Song S is similar to b” graded 0.6, and
“Song S belongs to E-Pop” graded 0, and “Song S belongs to Pop-R&B” graded 0.
• User 3: “Song S belongs to Pop-R&B” graded 0.2 and “Song S belongs to Funk” graded 0.6
and “Song S belongs to category ⊥” graded 0.
e pieces of evidence. e users’ responses constitute three pieces of evidence that we will rep-
resent as mass functions m : C → [0, 1], to each of which we can then associate belief and
plausibility functions as follows: for any c ∈ C,
belm(c) = Σ{m(d) | d ≤ c} and plm(c) = Σ{m(d) | c ∧ d , ⊥}.
Notice that, in order for the evidence to represent a mass and not a belief, it needs to specify the
probability that an object is in a category without being in any of its subcategories.
• To model User 1’s response, we need a mass function that assigns mass 0.2 to the smallest
category containing the song a, that is, the category that most accurately describes the
song a. is category is the category the extension of which is the closure of the singleton
{a}. In our example, this category is E-Pop = (a,wx). Hence, this statement translates into
the mass function m1 : C→ [0, 1] that maps E-Pop to 0.2, the category ⊤ of all songs in
the database to 0.8 and all other categories to 0.
• Similarly, User 2’s response translates into the mass function m2 : C → [0, 1] that maps
the smallest category containing both objects a and b (which is the category Pop = (ab, x))
to 0.6, the category ⊤ to 0.4 and the remaining categories to 0.
• Finally, User 3’s response translates into the mass function m3 : C → [0, 1] that maps
Pop-R&B to 0.2, the category Funk to 0.6, the category ⊤ to 0.2, and the remaining cate-
gories to 0. Notice that⊥might not be the empty category in general; indeed, by definition,
the members of ⊥ are the objects that share all the features in X .
e following table reports the values of the mass functions.
⊥ E-Pop Pop-R&B Funk Pop R&B ⊤
m1 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0.8
m2 0 0 0 0 0.6 0 0.4
m3 0 0 0.2 0.6 0 0 0.2
e following table reports the belief and plausibility functions corresponding to the mass func-
tions above:
⊥ E-Pop Pop-R&B Funk Pop R&B ⊤
belm1 0 0.2 0 0 0.2 0 1
plm1 0 1 0.8 0.8 1 0.8 1
belm2 0 0 0 0 0.6 0 1
plm2 0 1 1 0.4 0.6 1 1
belm3 0 0 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.8 1
plm3 0 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.4 1 1
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Combining pieces of evidence. Using the combination rule (12), we get the following aggregated
mass function, and its associated belief and plausibility functions:
⊥ E-Pop Pop-R&B Funk Pop R&B ⊤
m1⊕2⊕3 0 0.07 0.29 0.35 0.17 0 0.12
belm1⊕2⊕3 0 0.07 0.29 0.35 0.54 0.64 1
plm1⊕2⊕3 0 0.36 0.58 0.46 0.65 0.93 1
Analysis of the result. Dempster’s rule of combination treats every user’s piece of evidence as a
constraint for other users’ pieces of evidence. For example, if User 1 is reports that S is definitely
a Pop song (m1(Pop) = 1) and User 2 that S is definitely an R&B song (m2(R&B) = 1), then the
corresponding aggregated mass assignments yields m1⊕2(Pop-R&B) = 1, suggesting that S can be
definitely categorized as a member of the greatest common subcategory of Pop and R&B.
Notice that, in the example above, individual mass values for Funk and Pop are identical, hence
one cannot a priori tell which category best describes song S . However, the aggregated mass
function assigns Funk a greater value than Pop. Hence, combining evidence provides us with
more information and allows for a more accurate categorization of the given song S .
Notice also that m1(⊤) = 0.8 is a much higher value than m2(⊤) and m3(⊤). Saying that song S
belongs to ⊤ provides the least accurate categorization of S , which implies that User 1’s response
has the smallest impact on the combined evidence. Indeed, when combining mass functions m1
and m2, if one of them, say m2, is such that m2(⊤) = 1, then then the combined mass function
m1⊕2 coincides with m1, that is, m2 provides no information.
Notice that if mi (⊤) = 0 for any i = 1, 2, 3 then m1⊕2⊕3(⊤) = 0. Indeed, if C is any category for
which some mass function m satisfies m(C′) = 0, for all C′ ≥ C, then, on combining it with any
other mass function, the combined mass function m′ will also satisfy m′(C′) = 0 for all C′ ≥ C.
is shows that categorization based on combined mass is at least as informative as categorization
based on any individual piece of evidence.
Looking at the belief and plausibility functions obtained by combining evidence, one can see
that the highest belief and plausibility (while excluding ⊤) are assigned to R&B. is is the case
because User 3 provides a more significant piece of evidence than Users 1 and 2 and this piece
of evidence supports S being a member of Pop-R&B and Funk. Hence, in the aggregate, the mass
values of Pop-R&B and Funk are higher than the mass values of the other categories. e same
reasoning explains why the mass value of Pop is higher than that of E-Pop. Since R&B is a super-
category of Pop-R&B and Funk, the value of the combined belief function in R&B turns out to be
higher than that of the other categories.
5 EXAMPLE: PREFERENCE AGGREGATION
In the present section, we develop an example showing how the Dempster-Shafer rule for aggre-
gating mass functions can be usefully applied to also preference aggregation.
e scenario. Alice and Bob wish to watch a movie together, and query a movie database by
expressing their independent (graded) preferences. e soware interface interprets their prefer-
ences as mass functions on the database (modelled as a formal context), and combines them using
the rule of Section 3.3.
Case 1. Conflict with no resolution. Alice wishes to watch a romantic comedy and Bob a
chainsaw horror movie. e database they are querying, and its associated concept laice, look as
follows:
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x y z
a b c
c⊤ = (abc, ∅)
c1 = (a, x)
♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦
c2 = (c, z) c3 = (b,y)
❖❖❖❖❖❖❖❖❖❖❖
c⊥ = (∅, xyz)
♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣
◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆◆
e system interprets the categories ‘romantic comedy’ and ‘chainsaw horror movie’ as the
formal concepts c1 and c3, respectively, and encodes Alice and Bob’s preferences as the following
mass functions:
c⊥ c1 c2 c3 c⊤
m1 0 0.9 0 0 0.1
m2 0 0 0 0.9 0.1
e combination of the two masses above indicates that there is no way to accommodate both
preferences in the database:
c⊥ c1 c2 c3 c⊤
m1⊕2 0 0.47 0 0.47 0.06
Case 2. Reaching a compromise. Alice wishes to watch a romantic comedy but would con-
sider an action movie, while Bob much prefers a chainsaw horror movie but would consider an
action movie. e database they are querying, and its associated concept laice, are as in the
case above. e system interprets the categories ‘romantic comedy’, ‘action movie’ and ‘chain-
saw horror movie’ as the formal concepts c1, c2 and c3, respectively, and encodes Alice and Bob’s
preferences as the following mass functions:
c⊥ c1 c2 c3 c⊤
m1 0 0.9 0.1 0 0
m2 0 0 0.1 0.9 0
e combination of the two masses above disregards the conflict and highlights the convergence,
as in the original Dempster-Shafer seing:
c⊥ c1 c2 c3 c⊤
m1⊕2 0 0 1 0 0
Case 3. Solution to the conflict. Alice wishes to watch a romantic comedy and Bob an action
movie. is time, the database they are querying, and its associated concept laice, look as follows:
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x z y
a c
✁✁✁✁✁✁✁✁
❂❂❂❂❂❂❂❂
b
c⊤ = (abc, ∅)
c1 = (ac, x)
♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦
c3 = (bc,y)
❖❖❖❖❖❖❖❖❖❖❖
c⊥ = (c, xyz)
♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦
❖❖❖❖❖❖❖❖❖❖❖
at is, this database contains and object c that happens to be both a romantic comedy and an
action movie. e system interprets the categories ‘romantic comedy’, and ‘action movie’ as the
formal concepts c1 and c3, respectively, and encodes Alice and Bob’s preferences as the following
mass functions:
c⊥ c1 c3 c⊤
m1 0 0.9 0 0.1
m2 0 0 0.9 0.1
e combination of the two masses points at the solution that simultaneously satisfies Alice and
Bob’s preferences:
c⊥ c1 c3 c⊤
m1⊕2 0.81 0.09 0.09 0.01
6 CONCLUSION
We have introduced a framework which generalizes basic notions and results of Dempster-Shafer
theory from predicates to formal concepts, and illustrated the application of these tools by means
of case studies in which reasoning and decision-making under uncertainty are phrased as catego-
rization problems.
Towards a logical theory of conceptual evidence. In this paper we have not pursued an explicitly
logical approach; however, the structures introduced in Section 3.1 lend themselves naturally as
bases for models of an epistemic/probabilistic logic of categories generalizing the epistemic logics
for Dempster-Shafer theory introduced in [7, 15].
Dempster-Shafer theory of concepts and rough concepts. A key intermediate step to concretely
pursue the direction indicated in the previous point can be the connection currently emerging
between Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) and Rough Set eory (RST) [14]. Indeed, Rough Set
eory is a theory in information science which provides a purely qualitative modelling of in-
complete information via upper and lower definable approximations of given sets. Instances of
these definable approximations arise from outer and inner measures induced by probability mea-
sures (cf. [1, Section 7.3]), which provides a precise way to articulate the affinity between RST and
Dempster-Shafer theory. e connections between the two theories have been investigated in the
literature already for some time (cf. e.g. [18]).
e connection between FCA and RST builds on [2, 3], where a framework based on formal
concepts is introduced which serves as generalized Kripke semantics for an epistemic logic of cat-
egories. In [1], it is shown how the basic structures of RST can be represented as special structures
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based on formal contexts, in a way that ‘preserves the embedding’, as it were, between the natural
modal logics of these structures; in [9], it is shown how previous proposals for integrating FCA
and RST are subsumed by the logic-based proposal of [1].
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